Selected FMSF Newsletter Columns of Allen Feld
Allen Feld, M.S.W is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of Social Work at
Marywood University in Pennsylvania. Here is a selection of columns by
him, taken from FMSF Newsletters:
Other columns by Allen Feld may be found in the Newsletter Archives:
A CORNERSTONE FOR RESPONSIBLE PSYCHOTHERAPY
A Review by ALLEN FELD
HOUSE OF CARDS: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT ON MYTH by Robyn
Dawes (338 pages. Free Press $22.95) could easily (and perhaps
justifiably) be regarded as a book that criticizes psychotherapy and
psychologists; in reality, it is about improving the helping
professions and the services they provide to society. I see the
central theme of Robyn Dawes' book as simultaneously profound and
simple: there is an abundance of appropriate research studies, and
these studies should be the foundation of psychotherapy and should
override intuition, clinical experience, political posturing and
personal bias. While he writes from the perspective of a psychologist
and from the discipline of psychology, he targets his message to all
who offer themselves as therapists (psychiatrists, social workers and
counselors).
Like other authors who have raised questions about psychotherapy and
therapists, Dawes uses his personal experience and philosophy to
support his positions. While he never hesitates to let the reader
know his stance, each of his strongly held opinions is supported by
scientific evidence. In his book, he models the behavior that he asks
therapists to assume. He cites over 300 empirical investigations and
summaries of investigation to buttress his arguments. It is the
manner in which he uses the scientific material available that makes
his book so potentially valuable for therapists. In non-technical
language, Dawes explains the important statistical concepts that
readers must understand, and he uses examples that are readily
understandable to non-researchers. It is rare to find this kind of
reader-accessibility in a book which is scientifically based. As a
result, non-research professionals and college students should find
this book very readable.
The concern that non-scientific intuition is replacing critical
thinking is a recurring theme in this book. Dawes points out that
court decisions are impacted by "clinical judgment " and laws are
passed on the basis of unproved theories, resulting in gross
injustices and poor social policy. His unhappiness with the
diminishing part that research plays in his profession is evident by
his concern for the harm done from the belief in various myths. He
cites scientific evidence that dispels a number of these myths:
greater length of clinical experience does not increase the competence
of therapists; projective tests which require specialized training,
such as the Rorschach, are unreliable; and therapists with little
experience and training are often as effective as better-credentialed
and higher-priced therapists.
His suggestions about licensing and the pricing of psychotherapy are
equally provocative. Licensing, Dawes argues, is more important for
those staff who provide more direct and/or custodial care, and who
spend more time with clients. He claims it is a myth that the public
is protected by the current licensing process. Contained in his
suggestions about licensing is the requirement that therapists
demonstrate the use of scientific knowledge in their therapy, not
merely obtaining degrees and other credentials. His approach to
paying for therapy would also require social policy changes. He is
virtually libertarian in his views concerning individuals who don't
need society's protection and are paying therapists directly at an
exchange determined by the therapists and clients. However, when
therapists receive common funds, whether through third-party or tax
funds, only therapists who are licensed on the basis of knowledge
should be paid with licensed therapists receiving the same rate.
Since he has demonstrated by careful analysis of the research that
greater credentials do not necessarily lead to greater expertise, the
rate of payment therapists would receive should be the rate given to
private-practice social workers. No doubt some psychotherapists will
be uncomfortable with these kinds of suggestions.
He also uses his analysis of the research to challenge a variety of
other widely held clinical assumptions. Some of what is often
commonly believed fails to hold up under the scrutiny of available
research. Two such examples of myths he attempts to debunk: self-
esteem as an essential prerequisite to being productive people and
early childhood as a determinant of how we function as adults.
Robyn M. Dawes combines the skills of a researcher, teacher, writer,
and keenly perceptive observer of contemporary society with his strong
personal ethical standards and commitment to persons who seek therapy
and social justice. He has written a book which should be required
reading for those in the helping professions.
Allen Feld, ACSW, LSW is an Associate Professor at Marywood College,
School of Social Work, Scranton, PA. This review was written while he
was on sabbatical as a Research Associate with the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation.
WHAT THERAPISTS DON'T KNOW MAY HURT YOU!
A Review by Allen Feld
True and False Memories of Childhood Sexual Trauma: Suggestions of
Abuse by Michael D. Yapko (271 pages, Simon & Schuster $ 22.00) reads
like a conversation with a long-time friend and is a book that can be
easily read by the general public. What Dr. Yapko writes is
particularly important to therapists and to families who may be caught
up in the family situations created by accusations that arise from
false memories. The sentence, Abuse happens, but so do false memories.
(p.21) captures the simple truth that Yapko seems to want therapists
to understand. He approaches the task of trying to create that greater
understanding in a variety of ways: he uses his own research to
support his concern about misinformed therapists; he provides a
concise and current review of the scientific views about memory; he
thoroughly discusses the roles that therapists' thinking and the
contemporary societal climate play in enhancing suggestibility to and
believability of false memories of incest; his use of case examples
from his own clinical practice gives further meaning to the concerns
he expresses; and he offers concrete suggestions and advise to his
readers.
Yapko personalizes his comments and takes responsibility for his
beliefs. At times he is very forceful, his comments pointed and his
strong convictions and concerns are evident. However, he never
appeared to be attacking, demeaning or insensitive to therapists, even
when he was most critical of some of their serious shortcomings. This
may be due, in part, to his excellent skills as a communicator.
Another important reason why his book appeared to be non-threatening
is that it is hard to argue with the facts which he presents. He
reports his own research based on two questionnaires which he
developed and administered to more than one thousand therapists during
1992. The questionnaires, therapists' responses, and his discussion of
the reults are important elements in this book. Again, this is
presented in non-technical language so that non-professional as well
as professional audiences should find these portions of the book
equally satisfying. What he reports makes it clear as to why he is so
concerned (and perhaps why society should be concerned, too) about the
ignorance many therapists display concerning client suggestibility,
human memory and hypnosis. While it is uncertain if the results can be
generalized to all therapists, it would be foolhardy to ignore his
data for that reason. Yapko seems to be holding a mirror up to
therapists. One can only hope that what they see are true reflections
and what they don't auto- matically assume is that Yapko is writing
about some other therapists. If the suggestions to therapists were
followed, it is reasonable to believe there would be fewer shattered
lives.
Yapko demonstrates his understanding and concern for victims of
abuse and for those harmed by false memories. His first-hand
experience as a therapist has given him the vantage point of seeing
the pain from both perspectives. He explores the various difficulties
which often develop when only one spouse is accused and the
experiences of siblings who may have their loyalties tested. Here,
and in his discussion of meeting with the therapist of the accusing
child, Dr. Yapko seems to be a giver of advice. The suggestions he
makes undoubtedly are informed by his clinical experience, value
system and perhaps view of the world. Obviously, when it comes to
giving advice, others with different experiences, perspectives and
values would possibly suggest other ways to handle these situations.
At times, it seems like others in a family, already over-burdened with
accusations of incest, are asked to take on a helping role in addition
to their usual family roles. When a non-accused spouse or a sibling is
asked to assume certain additional new responsibilities because of the
accusations, e. g. keeping communication open or active neutrality,
that role may bring some unintended negative consequences. There may
not be enough cautions given to the readers. However, in the context
of this book, it is appropriate for him to step forward with his ideas
as long as the readers recognize the uniqueness of each situation.
Dr. Michael Yapko's entry into the ever-growing field of literature
on false memory can be viewed from the frame of reference of "bad news
good news". The "bad news" is that it portrays another example of the
sorry state of some therapy; the "good news" is that Yapko, a highly
regarded therapist, is joining the growing cadre of clinicians and
researchers and who are providing leadership by attempting to correct
the injustices being generated by therapist-assisted false memories.
Allen Feld, ACSW, LSW is an Associate Professor at Marywood College,
School of Social Work, Scranton, PA. This review was written while he
was on sabbatical as a Research Associate with the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation.
TWO REVIEWS by Allen Feld:
THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORIES:
FALSE MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE
by
Elizabeth Loftus and Katherine Ketcham
336 pages, St. Martin's Press $ 22.95
MAKING MONSTERS:
FALSE MEMORY, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA
by
Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters
app. 341 pages, Charles Scribner's Sons, estimated cost $22.00
* * *
STANDING UP FOR SCIENTIFIC TRUTH
If I refuse to budge as a scientist, perhaps
they could appeal to me as a woman...(p. 205)
"The Myth of Repressed Memories: False Memories and Allegations of
Sexual Abuse" is a first-person account of Loftus's involvement with
the scientific (and often political) debate about "repressed
memories." The book is written from Loftus's unique vantage points as
a scientist, expert witness and woman, as well as a confidant to
retractors, families, professionals, therapists, academics and
authors. The authors, who have collaborated previously on the
critically-acclaimed Witness for the Defense, describe how memories
can be constructed, integrating accounts of actual situations
involving "repressed memories" with analysis using the current
scientific understanding of memory.
Had Loftus and Ketcham chosen, they could have shifted the focus of
their book from the issues around repression to the pressure that was
placed on Loftus to bend her strong commitment to scientific proof.
Readers are explicitly exposed to the pressures that this highly
regarded scientist endures, although this is not the central theme of
the book. This allows us to glimpse what a scientist may face when
ideological and economic interests are central elements in what should
be largely a scientific debate. Loftus refuses to be expedient,
rejecting the suggestions and urgings from colleagues, friends and
antagonists that she change her expert opinion on matters or, at the
very least, remove herself from the debate about "repression". As a
scientist she seeks and respects proof, and because of her own
integrity is willing to face some anticipated conflicts from many who
would be her natural allies in most other situations.
A meeting with Ellen Bass, one of the authors of The Courage to
Heal, is described. The account of this meeting, reconstructed from
Loftus's notes, offers readers an unusual opportunity to "eavesdrop"
as two concerned individuals wrestle with their different views of the
world. There are many references to exchanges with therapists who
share a diametrically opposite view of memory. What emerges is a
picture of a professional whose own personal style simultaneously
rejects accommodation and strives to use dialogue, patience and
rationality with even her most strenuous detractors.
The authors make scientific arguments which refute the notion that
memories of trauma are frequently repressed and years later accurately
recalled, supporting these arguments with detailed accounts of actual
situations. Carefully and in non-technical language, the process of
fabricating memories is delineated. While being unequivocal about the
seriousness of childhood sexual abuse, they separate that important
societal problem from the presumed large number of people who
purported to have "repressed" their memories of sexual abuse.
While readers familiar with the debate about repression and
recovered memory therapy may have an initial impression that this is
familiar material, that will probably not be their conclusion after
reading these accounts. Loftus has been involved in some of the most
prominent and widely-publicized situations concerning repressed
memories. It is here where her intimate knowledge is central to the
importance of this book. For example, in the George Franklin case,
Loftus was an expert witness for the defense. In the Paul Ingram case,
she was asked to give an objective expert opinion for a television
station doing a documentary based on transcriptions of the tape-
recorded police interrogations. To those familiar with both cases,
further valuable insights will be gained into these compelling and
complex situations. Some of the other cases Loftus and Ketcham
describe may not be as well known, but are important in understanding
why the debate about memory and repression is not purely an academic
or clinical debate.
Attorney Steve Moen and his client Doug Nagle (pseudonym) portray
the difficulty that may be encountered in defending against false
accusations. This situation depicts so well the anguish a father (also
an attorney) experiences as he is torn between his survival instincts
and his devotion and desire to save his family. Moen's reactions and
his client's love for family are made real for readers. So too is Mike
and Dawn Patterson's love for each other and their accusing daughter,
Megan. This care led them to do what was unusual for them. The
Patersons hired a detective, who went as a pseudo-client to their
daughter's therapist, feigning symptoms that their daughter
had. Further insight is added by the detailed stories of retractors,
the primary victims of repressed memories, who made themselves
available to Loftus.
An important element is the authors' analysis of seven techniques
Renee Fredrickson describes in her book for helping recover repressed
memories. Each of these techniques is explained, followed by a WARNING
based on how these activities may create pseudomemories. In using both
Fredrickson's specific advice to therapists and the authors' "warning"
about advice, readers are offered both sides of the debate.
Elizabeth Loftus, a professor of psychology and adjunct professor of
law, and Katherine Ketcham, an author, were successful in using both
personal and scientific information, and have made an important
contribution to the fast-growing literature critical of repression
and recovered memory therapy. It is written in a style that should
appeal to a wide audience. What remains to be seen is whether a phrase
that Loftus reported repeating to herself in a particularly stressful
situation, This is a debate about memory, it's not ideology, will
become the broadly-accepted conviction in the controversy over
repressed memories.
* * *
HOW THINGS GO WRONG IN RECOVERED MEMORY THERAPY
"Making Monsters: False Memory, Psychotherapy and Sexual Hysterias"
a bold and comprehensive analysis of recovered memory therapy (RMT).
It is a book that will probably evoke a range of strong emotions for
most of its readers: sadness, because of the harm that RMT has done to
the clients and their families described in Making Monsters; anger,
that well-credentialed and highly-educated therapists, including some
who are leaders in their fields, believe, write and say some of the
things they do; empathy, as readers identify with clients and families
whose stories are such an important element in this book; hopefulness,
in reading about some people who have been egregiously harmed by RMT
and are attempting to put their lives together again; and even humor,
possibly coming from the absurdity of some of the belief systems
described.
The book is an unapologetic no-holds-barred expos of a therapy in
which "...opinion, metaphor and ideological preference substitute for
objective evidence." (p. 5). Ofshe, a social-psychologist, and
Watters, a journalist, weave together several different sources to
justify their conclusions. Therapists' accounts of their therapeutic
techniques and belief systems are integrated with scientifically-
accepted knowledge about memory and hypnotic states. The examples of
the powerful influences that therapists and groups have on clients,
particularly vulnerable ones, are integrated with factual accounts of
families who have been devastated by RMT.
The authors seem to work well as a team, avoiding jargon, and
explaining professional terms in non-technical language. This allows
the book to serve as both a text book and one that the general public
may find important. The discussions of robust repression and
repression, historical and narrative truth and their use (or misuse)
in clinical situations, therapist influence, hypnosis and hypnotic
states are based on their analysis of current research. For the
readers who may be unfamiliar with some of these theoretical aspects,
this book offers a sufficient and readily-understandable overview. For
those who are more acquainted with them, it serves as a good review
and possibly an update of current sources. These discussions are
important foundations for understanding how memories can be created
and why Ofshe and Watters refer to RMT as a pseudo science.
While some challenges to the authors' discussions of theoretical
issues can be expected, the analysis of the work and beliefs of some
RMT proponents might possibly stimulate a more heated debate. It is
here that Ofshe and Watters name names and don't hesitate to point
fingers. The chapters on Satanic Abuse and Multiple Personality
Disorder (Dissociative Identity Disorder) and the words of Cory
(D. Corydon) Hammond and Colin Ross will no doubt spark debate in some
quarters. Their examination of several of the widely-used checklists
that seem to be favored by so many RMT therapists led them to conclude
that these checklist were so general in nature that their use in
therapeutic situations was unwarranted. The critique of the research
and the subsequent conclusions of Herman, Terr and Williams adds to
the academic importance of this book and might also stimulate some
controversy. In several of these discussions and analyses the authors'
subjectivity comes into play. However, a degree of subjectively is
inherent in analysis and often becomes the source for criticisms.
The case examples cited provide the moral basis for the concerns
that are expressed about the pseudoscientific dimension of RMT and
remove the debate from merely an academic exercise. There are
anecdotal accounts of how memories of abuse may be created using
traditional talking-therapy as well as hypnosis. The chapters on MPD
as an artifact and Satanic abuse are important descriptions of how
iatrogenic illnesses can be created. It is in some of these stories
that people's resiliency can be seen. While each situation described
in this book is poignant, Anne Stone and her family's experience with
RMT is unusually powerful. The authors' decision to include it was
impacted by two interrelated factors: Anne's experience exemplifies
the most severe outcome of recovered memory therapy." and "...many
years of her treatment were spent under the care of two of the nations
best-known experts on recovered memory therapy and multiple
personality disorder (app. p 225) No synopsis of this situation can
adequately encapsulate this account which includes memories of child
abuse, multiple personality disorder and torture in a satanic cult.
What began as Anne's therapy with a psychiatric social worker after an
extremely difficult birth led to hospitalizations, drug therapy,
hypnosis, and hospitalization of her two sons. Anne became to believe
she was "a High Priestess" in a satanic cult and her therapists
introduced her in public with this title. Anne and her family's
strength are also a source of hope. In spite of the years of
questionable therapy, the authors report that the family seems to be
putting their lives back together. This and other actual accounts
fully describe the intangible cost of RMT to clients and their
families. The economic costs of this therapy are only inferred.
"Making Monsters" is a compelling book, written for a wide audience,
well-documented and a good resource about one of society's significant
contemporary, social and therapeutic issues. It is certain that it
will not please everyone. It is just as certain that the authors did
not set that as one of their goals.
Allen Feld, ACSW, LSW is an Associate Professor at Marywood College,
School of Social Work, Scranton, PA. He also serves as a consultant
with the False Memory Syndrome Foundation.
CLIENT/THERAPIST NARRATIVE -- NOT NARRATIVE TRUTH
Allen Feld
As a client and therapist engage in therapy, what unfolds is a
narrative, and since therapy is an interactive process, this can
accurately be identified as a Client/Therapist Narrative. However,
sound therapy suggests that this collaborative narrative, which is
often referred to as _narrative truth_, should be approached with a
skepticism similar to that applied in the scientific method. While
the client (and/or therapist) may believe the narrative, its truth can
rarely be discovered in the clinician's office. Including the word
_truth_ in devising a term to describe this important clinical
activity is much more of problem than a misuse of the English
language, and nowhere is this more evident than when issues around
"recovered memories" of incest are discussed. Incest is an act -- a
behavior -- and therefore has the potential of being verified. There is
another significant aspect which seems to often be overlooked in
dealing with adult clients who may be questioning their memories about
early childhood incest or other events from their distant past. These
clients typically enter therapy with a variety of symptoms and may
frequently be questioning their own mental health. _Recognizing
reality is a sign of positive mental health_. When therapists and
clients synthesize the clients' past with metaphoric memories and
therapists make no effort to test these for reality, it is difficult
to understand how they can claim to be helping their clients. For
therapists who believe that decade- delayed recalled memories of
incest need not be verified or that "narratives" equate to the
client's reality and that is good enough, the burden of proof is
theirs. It is their professional obligation to publish in refereed
journals the research and outcome studies that demonstrate that, by
ignoring any effort to help their clients search for reality, these
clients are actually being helped.
Allen Feld is an assistant professor of Social Work at Marywood
College in Pennsylvania and is active in continuing education.
Victimhood and the Psychology Industry: A Symbiotic Relationship
Reviewer: Allen Feld, LCSW
Review of:
Manufacturing Victims: What the Psychology Industry is Doing to People
Tana Dineen (328 pages. Robert Davies Publishing)
Tana Dineen's well-researched and extensively referenced book is a
valuable addition to the expanding number of critiques that expose the
dangers, mixed results and even the follies of interventions of the
helping professions. Manufacturing Victims is unique in its approach;
it combines historical and sociological perspectives to why
contemporary American society is fertile ground for the geometric
growth of a Psychology Industry. Dr. Dineen skillfully integrates her
philosophical position with thoughtful analysis and commentary on
salient research, several significant psychological constructs,
contemporary literature and anecdotal accounts of former and current
clients of the Psychology Industry.
Dineen uses the phrase Psychology Industry to include psychiatrists,
psychologists, clinical social workers, psychoanalysts,
psychotherapists, etc., thereby creating a significant pool of
therapists who will likely criticize this book. Since the author has
spent more than two decades as a clinical psychologist, she brings
credibility to her position. She is unrelenting in her concern for
"damaged people, divided families, distorted justice..." and the
abandonment by the Industry of critical thinking in favor of power,
profit and prestige. The use of the word "Industry" is well-suited to
her theme. She describes how the Industry manufactures clients
(victims), markets its services, advertises itself -- both with paid
ads and with free publicity from pro bono crisis work, and attempts to
expand its sphere of influence.
Creating victims adds to the wealth of the psychology industry.
Dineen suggests that three principles underlie the manufacturing
process: Psychologizing -- the use of psychological constructs to
reduce real experience to psychological terms; Pathologizing --
transforming ordinary people who undergo abnormal experiences into
abnormal people; Generalizing -- blurring the boundaries between the
brutal or exceptional and the mundane or ordinary. Dramatic examples
of the misuse of ideas from well-known authors such as Kubler-Ross
(Death and Dying) and Weisel (on the Holocaust) define and dramatize
these concepts.
The personal experiences of manufactured victims such as retractors
help define three priniciples that differentiate actual victims from
fabricated ones. Synthetic describes those fabricated victims who
succumb to suggestion for reasons such as their present vulnerability
or high degree of suggestibility. (A number of retractors have often
expressed this.) Contrived victims refer to those who have a genuine
medical condition, but a possible psychological cause is attributed to
the condition. Counterfeit refers to those victims who seek a
secondary gain. This last classification can refer to someone like
Kenneth Bianchi (The Hillside Strangler), who feigned MPD to avoid
responsibility for multiple murders. Martin Orne, a member of the FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board, was instrumental in
unmasking that attempt to subvert justice. The production of victims,
according to Dr. Dineen, leads to several outcomes: creating more
clients, enhancing the power and prestige of members of the Industry
(e.g. as expert witnesses, talk-show guests, television news
commentaries, etc...) and generating more income and profits.
Dineen's material is current. She makes good use of the Washington
State's Crime Victim Compensation Program Study that was mentioned in
the Newsletter (May, 1996). Her comprehensive analysis of the 1995
Consumer Reports (CR) study on "The effectiveness of psychotherapy"
supports markedly different conclusions from those suggested by the
author. The same data, she argues, suggest that the sampling technique
was unscientific and the percentage of questionnaires returned so poor
that CR serves only the economic agenda of the Psychology Industry.
She believes the Industry ultimately cannot reform itself. However
this book and its stinging criticism of the helping professions may be
helpful in getting the Industry back on course.
D E B U N K I N G
T R A U M A T I C M E M O R Y A S S P E C I A L
by Allen Feld
Moira Johnson, author of Spectral Evidence, said that we are
experiencing the "golden age of memory research." The publication of a
special memory issue of Current Directions in Psychological Science
(6,3: June, 1997) adds support for her view.
Included in the many important articles in this issue is one that
asks, "Is Traumatic Memory Special?" by Katharine Shobe and John
Kihlstrom. For anyone who is wrestling with the often claimed, yet
unproved, mantra that "traumatic memory is special," this article is a
must. The arguments for this highly questionable hypothesis are
concisely described and then, with the precision of surgeons, the
authors detail the serious scientific flaws in the assumptions and
research.
After placing traumatic memory in historical perspective by
reviewing Janet, Breuer and Freud, the authors examine contemporary
voices. Much of contemporary belief in the specialness of traumatic
memory derives from the work of Lenore Terr, who posited that repeated
traumatic events occurring over an extended period of time (Type II
trauma) are poorly remembered, but that a single clearly defined
incident (Type I trauma) will not be forgotten. This theory was a
solution to the neuroscientific as well as the behavioral and
cognitive evidence that explicit memory for emotionally arousing
events tends to be permanent. Shobe and Kihlstrom show both the
deficiency in Terr's research and how other research readily explains
some of her data.
Bessel van der Kolk, often associated with the concept of body
memories, argues that explicit memories (such as memory for details
and events) are interfered with by traumatic stress, while "sensory,
motor or affective representations" of traumatic events are deeply
imprinted as part of implicit memory.
The blatant weakness of this research becomes apparent when the
process of selecting the sample, the strong potential for bias within
the sample, the lack of control for comparisons between traumatic and
non-traumatic events that were made by the subjects, the age when the
abuse may have happened and the retrospective nature of the study are
examined. The theory of "betrayal trauma" rests on the assumptions
that a betrayal (such as sexual abuse) by an important figure (like a
parent) and the dependence of the child on the abuser are the reasons
people forget their abuse. This theory would explain why trauma
effects on memory seem variable. Shobe and Kihlstrom note that this
theory, proposed by Jennifer Freyd, is "...almost entirely
speculative" (73). They claim that some of the scientific
justifications that Freyd attempts to use "are of unclear relevance to
her theory" (ibid.). Freyd speculated that Type II traumas involved
betrayal but she did not deal with the methodological problems of
those studies.
Shobe and Kihlstrom debunk Charles Whitfield's belief that traumatic
memory is state dependent. They note that "All memory is dependent on
the degree of congruence between the context in which encoding took
place and that in which retrieval is attempted." (ibid.) This is
particularly important because it seriously undermines the
justification of memory recovery techniques (e.g. hypnosis, other
hypnotic-like techniques like age regression, guided imagery, sodium
amytal, etc.) to enhance memory.
Even if there were research demonstrating that traumatic memories
are state dependent, there would still be no reason to conclude that
they are special. (There is, however, no laboratory or clinical
evidence that traumatic memory is state dependent.)
Shobe and Kihlstrom's article surveys a key claim that proponents of
traumatic memory often make in the courts. One wishes that all judges
who have to make a decision concerning the scientific basis for
evidence presented in recovered memory cases would read this article.
Other informative articles in this issue are:
LYNN, S.J. & PAYNE, D.G. Memory as the theater of the past: The
psychology of false memories
PAYNE, D.G. et al:Compelling memory illusions: The qualitative
characteristics of false memories
LOFTUS, E.G.: Memory for a past that never was
SCHACTER, D.: False recognition and the brain
BRUCK, M. & CECI, S.J.: The suggestibility of young children
LYNN, S.J. et al: Recalling the unrecallable: Should hypnosis be
used to recover memories in psychotherapy?
Can Misinterpreted Dreams Lead to False Memories?
Allen Feld, MSW
Those of us who attended the March 1997 FMSF family conference in
Baltimore were introduced by Elizabeth Loftus to research on dream
interpretation and the creation of false memories. She described some
of her earlier work with an Italian colleague, Giuliana A. L. Mazzoni
from the University of Florence. Dr. Mazzoni is a highly-respected
clinical and cognitive psychologist.
This past February Dr. Loftus updated their work at a conference on
false memory creation cosponsored by The Elliot and Eleanor Goldstein
Foundation and Florida Atlantic University. This research is probably
among the most significant to date on the potentially powerful
influence of therapists in creating false beliefs about events that
did not happen. In addition, it addresses the potential harm in
relying on dream interpretation to establish the accuracy of a
client's memory.
Critics have complained that previous research demonstrating that a
substantial number of people (depending on the design, but often 25%)
will create false memories when they are given even modest suggestions
about events that did not occur. The criticisms typically maintain
that creating memories of being lost in a mall, or knocking over a
punch bowl at a wedding, or even putting one's hand through a window
do not depict "real trauma."
This criticism is disingenuous. Critics who choose this as a route
to denigrate research with which they disagree know that it would be
ethically and professionally wrong to design research that replicated
false memories of sexual abuse.
Another criticism is that this type of research is unlike a clinical
experience. The recent Mazzoni and Loftus research, however,
incorporates an important clinical-like element in what is an
excellent research design utilizing a control group and an
experimental group. In testing drugs, for instance, an experimental
group receives the treatment, a control group receives a placebo and
neither group knows whether they are taking real medications or
placebos. This procedure strengthens the probability that the research
will only measure the effect, if any, of the drug treatment. Mazzoni
and Loftus have incorporated these elements in their research.
A pool of volunteers (typically undergraduate students) at the
University of Florence and University of Washington completed an
instrument called the Life Events Inventory (LEI). Individuals who
reported that it was unlikely that they experienced certain events,
such as being lost for an extended period of time before age three,
were included in the research.The LEI includes three statements that
are referred to as "critical items" ("3. got lost in a public space;
19. was abandoned by parents; 32. found myself lonely and lost in an
unfamiliar place"). The control group completed the 36-item instrument
at two different time intervals, 3 to 4 weeks apart, and that was
their only involvement in the research project.
The experimental group, in addition to completing the LEI twice at
the same intervals as the control group, was also involved in what
they believed to be a different study that had no relationship to the
LEI questionnaire-an experiment on dream interpretation. This
30-minute "clinical interview" was conducted approximately 10 to 15
days after the first LEI session. Regardless of the nature of the
dream, suggestions were made by the interviewer, a clinical
psychologist, that the dream content was a sign of unpleasant and
unremembered childhood memories. The fact that the experimental group
believed that the dream interpretation study was not a part of the LEI
study served to minimize the confounding effect of bias on the part of
research subjects.
The results were analyzed to determine if there were any changes in
the LEI scores on the three critical items between the first and the
second administration. Statistical analysis reveals that the group
that had the dream interview had significantly higher scores on the
three critical items in the second administration. The research
protocol, it should be noted, included appropriate debriefing.
Although students are frequently used in research studies, critics
will likely assert that there is a difference between a clinical
population and student volunteers. But it can be persuasively argued
that the volunteers may be less prone to influence than a clinical
population.
This conclusion might be stated with even stronger conviction when
the issue of relationship is considered. It is reasonable to assume
that the intensity of a relationship in a 30-minute session would not
be as strong as the relationship that one would expect to develop in
an actual therapeutic situation. The potential influence of a dream
interpretation in therapy, therefore, would likely be much more
profound than a "mistaken dream interpretation" in a university study.
This research contributes significantly to our understanding of the
potent effects of suggestions made by an authority figure. That this
influence may be present even when the contact is as brief as a
30-minute interview should be a cautionary harbinger for therapists.
These issues are discussed in: Mazzoni, G. A. L. & Loftus, E. F. (in
press) "Dreaming, believing and remembering." The article will appear
in The Narrative Construction of Reality: Imaginings, Believings,
Rememberings. J. DeRivera & T. R. Sarbin (eds.) Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Allen Feld is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of Social
Work at Marywood College in Pennsylvania.
ANOTHER LOOK AT THE APA WORKING GROUP'S REPORT:
Review of paper by C. Brooks Brenneis
Allen Feld
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ``If this represents the level of documentation so confidently |
| presented by Alpert et al., one may indeed be left with serious |
| questions about the strength of their overall argument.'' (p 537) |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
I find it impossible to be even-handed. The conclusions drawn by
the clinicians may be even weaker than assessed by the researchers;
conversely, the critique offered by the clinicians of the researchers'
evidence is more impassioned than apt. (p. 532, Brenneis, 1997).
I'm guilty of admiring C. Brooks Brenneis' writings. He deals with
complex issues in a manner that I find understandable; he is an
experienced practitioner with impressive credentials in
psychoanalysis; he cuts to the heart of the ``recovered memory'' issue
by stripping away the often passionate debate surrounding it; he
understands and is influenced by science in his clinical practice and
writings. He also has the courage to speak his convictions. A frequent
author in psychoanalytical journals, Brenneis dares to write about
issues important to FMSF. He frequently challenges his fellow
clinicians to examine their beliefs and recognize how those beliefs
often influence the outcome of their therapy.
In 1993, the American Psychological Association appointed six Ph.D.
psychologists (three clinicians: Judith L. Alpert, Laura S. Brown,
Christine A. Courtois, and three researchers: Stephen J. Ceci,
Elizabeth F. Loftus and Peter A. Ornstein) to a Working Group On
Investigation of Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse. Brenneis has
critiqued the published results of that working group.[1]
Brenneis argues that clinicians Alpert, Brown and Courtois ignore
essential facts about Sigmund Freud's work in pressing their case for
``repressed memories.'' He points out that they have relied on the
work of van der Kolk to buttress their use of Janet who a century ago
developed the unsubstantiated notion that there is a relationship
between trauma, dissociation and amnesia. He notes that they are also
in error in relying on the theory of Lenore Terr that if trauma is
repeated it is more likely to be forgotten than is a single episode.
Terr also believes that it is possible to use current symptoms to
determine historical events.
Brenneis writes: ``Aside from the fact that Terr's notion about
forgetting repeated trauma is inconsistent with nearly all that is
known about memory, no one has tested this hypothesis in a rigorous
way.'' Rigorous testing, he notes, would ``require judges to be blind to
individual's histories (trauma, no trauma) to observe their behavior
and examine their dreams and accounts of somatosensory experience.
Could they divine the nature of the underlying trauma, if it existed?''
Brenneis reviews the anecdotal evidence used by Alpert et al. to
support their belief that people frequently forget abuse. He observed
that some of the cases they used were based on media accounts, others
had too few details to allow for close examination and still others
had so many potential flaws that their accuracy could reasonably be in
question. Commenting on one study Brenneis notes, ``If this represents
the level of documentation so confidently presented by Alpert et al.,
one may indeed be left with serious questions about the strength of
their overall argument.'' Indeed, this comment is apt for the
clinicians' general use of anecdotal evidence.
Brenneis expresses concern that Alpert, Brown and Courtois do not
demonstrate reasonable familiarity with laboratory/empirical research.
He cites their use of a 1981 study by Bower as an example. That study
was used to support their interpretation of the place that state- or
mood-dependent memory plays in helping someone recall alleged abuse.
However, as Brenneis points out, in 1989 Bower & Mayer wrote that in
six other studies they had been unable to find stable evidence for a
mood dependent retrieval effect. Students in their first research
course are introduced to the necessity of replicating research to
affirm the importance of the findings in the original research. The
inability to replicate the 1981 research is ignored by Alpert, Brown
and Courtois.
The clinicians' bias against experimental research is evident.
Brenneis notes that while they criticize laboratory research as
irrelevant to clinical situations, they show no reluctance to use it
when they like the results. And, he points out, they actually
overstated the value of these results.
Brenneis goes on to introduce the notion of ``Mutual influence out of
awareness...'' that is to be found in therapist patient interactions.
Based on the early work of Martin Orne, he writes about the indirect
communications and cues that flow between client and therapist and
about the embedding of beliefs that are out of awareness. At the same
time, Brenneis is accutely aware and appreciative that the therapeutic
process depends on the important interactions between therapists and
clients.
Brenneis has no trouble separating scientific skepticism and
critical examination from disbelief in stories of true victimization.
He reminds Alpert, Brown and Courtois that their ``uncritical...
interpretations of the assembled evidence may, paradoxically, enhance
the 'disbelief in victims stories'''.
Brenneis concludes by pointing out that people are often resistant
to change even in the face of contrary evidence. ``We are emotionally
invested in our cherished beliefs and resist altering them,'' he
writes.(p. 543) While both the clinicians and the scientists defend
their views with passion, Brenneis perceives that the clinicians
``weigh their [own] evidence far too heavily and that of the
researchers far too lightly'' (ibid.). It is difficult separating
cherished beliefs of clinicians from clinical evidence. Recovered
memories may reflect the cherished beliefs of the clinicians who help
recover them..
[1] Brenneis, C. B., Final report of APA Working Group on
Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse: A critical
commentary. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 14(4), 531-547.
Allen Feld is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of Social
Work at Marywood University in Pennsylvania.
REACTIONS TO A PRIMER ON FMS
FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS
Allen Feld, MSW
Stocks, J. T. (1998).
Recovered Memory Therapy: A Dubious Practice Technique.
in Social Work, 43, 5. 423-436.
NASW has finally published an article informing its membership of the
hazards inherent in FMS. This article is important for several
reasons: it addresses the scientific shortcomings of techniques used
to recover memories; it appears in the most widely available NASW
professional journal; it is well-documented; it was written by an
author with no affiliation to the FMS Foundation -- meaning that it
may be accepted as an objective commentary.
As a retired social work educator and a former 35-year-member of
NASW, I have some reactions to Dr. Stocks' article. For the past
several years I have been critical of NASW for not adequately
informing its membership of the problems and controversy surrounding
false memories. Although not all social workers belong to NASW, the
organization is still perceived as speaking for the profession. This
critical article, published in the flagship social work journal, has
two merits: it will prevent more clients from being harmed in therapy,
and prevent more families from being torn apart.
In the abstract Stocks writes:
Evidence suggests that true and false memories can be recovered
using memory work techniques, and there is no evidence that
reliable discriminations can be made between them. Similarly, there
is no empirical evidence that recovered memory techniques result in
improved outcomes for participating clients (p. 423).
Stocks cites more than 100 references to support these conclusions,
selecting authors on both sides of the controversy to determine the
scientific evidence.
A major contribution of this article is a brief review of 10
so-called recovered memory techniques or therapeutic activities that
some therapists claim validate memories: sexual abuse symptoms, body
work, hypnosis, dream interpretation; flashbacks; guided imagery;
journaling; "truth serum;" survivor groups; and disputing client
doubts. The review first describes each technique. Then it discusses
ways therapists might use that technique to "recover memories." Stocks
repeatedly reminds readers of an important fact: no empirical evidence
indicates that any of these techniques lead to accurate memory
recovery.
For example, Stocks' review of guided imagery includes this
significant observation: Guided imagery is a form of psychodrama in
which the client achieves a relaxed state and then pictures scenarios
suggested by the therapist (p. 428). The hypnotic-like quality of this
technique will no doubt be readily apparent to readers of the
Newsletter, and of course, readers do not need to be reminded that the
risk of therapist's suggestion is increased under hypnosis.
Another contribution of Stocks' article is that it contains several
useful and timely admonitions: "This desire [to be viewed positively
by a therapist] creates a powerful incentive to tailor memories to the
therapist pattern" (p. 428). Similar statements are supported by
citing the research that allows the author to reach these
scientifically based conclusions.
Stocks also demonstrates the harm that comes to clients exposed to
therapy based on these techniques, and to the therapists who employ
these practices.
A brief retelling of what I remember as my introduction to what is
now called guided imagery might be in order. This concept was not
considered important enough to be part of graduate education when I
was a student; I first encountered this notion in what was called a
professional development seminar. (Licensing had not yet come to
social workers, so there was no need to label these educational
experiences as continuing education.) Nothing was suggested, as I
recall, that warranted using guided imagery to address the past;
rather, the focus was on current and future problems. It was fully
understood that guided imagery was intended to be used to help solve
problems; it was believed that a client might use this technique to
reduce anxiety or stress, or to develop a scenario of ways to handle
distasteful life situations. No one expressed or implied that clients
might be able to determine the historical reality of their pasts, or
that the imagery was based in reality.
I am disappointed that NASW has been slow to respond to the crisis
and inform its members of the harm that may be done when therapists'
beliefs replace science in their practices. However, publishing
Stocks' article is an excellent effort to rectify this delay. I'm
pleased that the Social Work peer-review process recognized both the
soundness of the research and the important contemporary social
problem that Stocks addressed.
Allen Feld is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of Social
Work at Marywood College in Pennsylvania.
CLIENTS THERAPEUTICALLY CREATED PASTS AND PRESENT INFLUENCES
CAN LEAD TO FUTURE PROBLEMS
Allen Feld
I have always questioned the therapeutic necessity, wisdom and
relevance of delving deeply into a client's past-especially a client's
remote past or early childhood. These concerns become even more robust
if the reasons for such exploration are vague or not scientifically
supported. I remain bewildered by the apparent subjective
interpretation frequently used in this type of therapeutic approach
and befuddled by the lack of verifiable "evidence" to support
questionable conclusions. The devastating experiences of FMSF families
have reinforced those concerns. It is important to stress: My
questioning has been directed to the therapeutic use of the past and
not the personal importance that people may ascribe to their past.
Early in my social work career, when colleagues discussed dealing
with a client's past, I had at least the following three questions: a)
Even if the therapist's role in developing a client's narrative of the
past can be set aside, how is it possible for a therapist to judge the
accuracy of the client's created narrative? b) Precisely how does a
therapist help a client in the present time with information from the
past? c) How would (or, does) a therapist alter her/his approach to
helping, if the client's narrative were different?
Simply stated, I rejected the notion that the past determined a
client's present or future. While I accepted the importance that
people often place in what they believe are their pasts, I juxtaposed
that with the concerns I had about the reliability of specific details
of a person's early years. Understanding that the client's telling of
her narrative was an outgrowth of an exchange with the therapist, I
recognized that the exchange itself had a significant potential to
impact the final product.
Over time, I sometimes wondered if myth-making had become an
important component in some therapists' approach to helping. I believe
that my questioning has merit, in part, for the following reasons:
therapists have no way to determine the truth and validity of a
client's reporting of the past. In fact, I sensed some didn't even
seem to care about historical accuracy. A therapist may express keen
interest in a client's narrative and this, coupled with the client's
desire to please this important "authority figure," might inflate the
importance of the narrative; although a client might be in therapy for
only one hour, therapy may be with a client the remaining 167 hours of
the week; if the past were distorted in its telling by the client, and
possibly further distorted, even unintentionally, by the therapist
with such things as misunderstood comments, questions, speculations,
interpretations and/or the client's "homework," clients might
integrate distortions into their life story.
Thus, with relative ease a myth can be created. Over time and with
continued therapeutic exchanges, the strength of the client's and
therapist's belief in the myth might grow. A myth can become a
virtually unshakable reality. Indeed, readers of the Newsletter are
aware of the harm that these myths caused, and are still causing, to
families. This scenario describes, at least in part, an example of
what some call covert influences that occur in therapy.
C. Brooks Brenneis [1] (p. xvi)describes Martin T. Orne's [2]
importance in articulating this phenomenon.
...Orne (1962) captured the process of influence and suggestion
quite differently from what I had imagined it to be. Where I
anticipated deliberate indoctrination foisted upon a more or less
passively receptive subject, Orne saw shades of influence, covertly
expressed, and running back and forth between, in his examples,
experimenters and subjects. This turned out to be the barest
beginning of the literature on covert influence. Compelling,
painstaking accumulated evidence now makes it indisputable that
powerful ideas may be triggered and inculcated without either
participant's conscious awareness. In fact, the absence of conscious
awareness may potentiate the effects of influence. As patient or
therapist we are quite capable of intuiting, without conscious
awareness, the unconscious belief of others, even ideas which, when
raised to consciousness, are disavowed.
The power of a therapist's belief system in determining not only
what is consciously and explicitly emphasized but also what is
unintentionally or implicitly emphasized in therapy should not be
understated or overlooked. I believe that these two concepts, covert
influence and therapists' belief system, at the very minimum, impact
and affect each other and may ultimately merge. I might even be
persuaded to accept the proposition that some therapists who claim
they did not influence the "discovery" of memories of incest, or some
clients who are adamant in stating that they have not been influenced
by the therapist, may actually be unaware of how therapeutic
influences such as these may be at play.
A client is not expected to be cognizant of how unintended
influences impact the therapist and her therapy. However, the standard
for a therapist is, and must be, different. A therapist's lack of
awareness of possible unintended influences is unacceptable. Some may
argue that a therapist's error of not comprehending or considering the
heavy influence he or she exerts merits their escaping especially
severe sanctions in false-memory cases. I vehemently disagree. The
sanctions should be equally severe regardless of a therapist's
awareness or consciousness of that influence. The damage to the client
and the ensuing family devastation occur whether the influence is
intended or not.
Additionally, therapists represent themselves as possessing, are
assumed by their clients to possess and indeed should possess, the
requisite skills and knowledge to understand fully the influence that
they may potentially exert. Therapists' work should, as dictated by
the credo of medicine, "cause no harm." Clients are entitled to this;
their clients' families deserve this; society should demand this.
[1] Brenneis, B. C. (1997) Recovered memory of trauma: Transferring
the present to the past, International Universities Press.
[2] Orne, M.T. (1962) On the social psychology of the psychology
experiment: With particular emphasis to demand characteristics and
their implications. American Psychologist, 17: 776-783.
Allen Feld is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of Social
Work at Marywood University in Pennsylvania.
The Role of Suggestive Questions, Social Influence, Reinforcement, and
Removal in Creating Adult False Memories
Garven, S., Wood, J. M., Malpass, R. S., Shaw III, J. S.
More than suggestion: The effect of interviewing techniques from the
McMartin preschool case. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1998, 33,
347-359.
Review by Allen Feld
There has been a tendency by some professionals and families to
oversimplify how false statements may be obtained from clients by
attributing the process solely to "suggestive interviewing." While
that "short-hand" term may be useful to a lay person's understanding,
professionals also often oversimplify the process. It is not unusual
for a therapist to assert: "I don't ask suggestive questions." But do
those who make that statement recognize what might be considered
"suggestive?" Are they sensitive to the effect of repeated questions
or the "asked-and-answered" technique? Importantly, have they
considered other factors when they make such a claim?
While Garven et al. use the injustices of the McMartin day care
case as an organizing theme for their research and article, they are
unequivocal in their contention that the research relates to adults as
well as to children: "First, research has repeatedly shown that
suggestive questions influence the immediate and subsequent reports of
adults." (p. 355) They present other factors that they consider to
play an important part in developing false statements, and use what
they identify as the SIRR model to explain the interaction of these
factors: Suggestive questions, social Influences, Reinforcement and
Removal from direct experiences. One of the values of this article is
that the definitions of these four terms are concise and free of
jargon, and clear examples are given to provide greater meaning to
these terms.
There are other reasons I find this article important. In
discussing it with a colleague, the point was made that this article
may help parents more fully understand the often-asked question: "How
could this happen?" We also believe it important for attorneys
involved in recovered memory litigation to be familiar with this
article.
The conclusions Garven et al. reach are research-supported. Six
problematic techniques from the McMartin interviews are reviewed and
analyzed using current research. Their article describes the results
of a study they conducted showing that social influence and
reinforcement "appeared to be more powerful determinants of children's
answers than simple suggestion." (p. 347) They also make the
significant point that "Research findings and theory from the past 50
years would have predicted the results" (emphasis added). (p. 355)
Retractors' reports of their experiences in therapy and much of
the recent research cited in previous Newsletters add weight to this
statement. Now, when will professional organizations and licensing
boards become proactive in assuring that under-informed or misinformed
therapists harm fewer clients and their families?
MOVING ON
Allen Feld
At a recent small informal gathering of FMS families, I had the
opportunity to speak individually with many parents. I don't believe
that any of the families at this gathering had a specific retraction,
but I am aware that some of these families had their accuser "return"
to the family, while others have had recent contact with the accusing
offspring.
Regardless of the fact that the ranks of reunited families
continue to grow, reunification has yet to take place for most
families. Newsletter readers recognize that reunited families
represent the minority of families in contact with the Foundation. The
majority of families that I've spoken with are not reunited, although
they express hope (or, at least a wish) for a retraction. Failing
that, some have expressed willingness to have some contact with their
estranged offspring, at the very least. However, there are also a
small number of families who have adamantly stressed to me that
contact without a retraction is unthinkable and totally unacceptable.
Families deal with the uncertainty and confusion that result from
false memories and accusations in a variety of ways. While reliable
research is lacking, anecdotal accounts offer a glimpse into how
families who are not reunited contend with their situations.
In those families who say they still have hope, many mention their
relationship with their spouse as the key pillar of their
support. Others report that their other children are a source of love,
support, and strength and, they believe (or hope), a possible link or
path to reunification. A significant number of parents who maintain
hope tell how happy they are that they have each other and/or other
family members.
Some tell me prayer is an important avenue for them in their hope
to reunite the family. Some talk about friends that they rely on.
Meeting with other families is identified as an important source of
support. A few mention being involved briefly in therapy. A number
describe their use of cards, letters, email, etc. in an attempt to
reestablish communication and express their continuing love. For many,
the hope or wish for reunification is ever present and the situation
is often on their minds.
A small number of families at the gathering, however, told me that
they have decided on a course that must have been difficult to reach.
In a culture that places such a heavy emphasis on family unity, it is
a position that does not readily lend itself to public discussion. The
term "moving on," or something quite similar, was often mentioned.
What I mean by that phrase is that the shock and family upheaval
caused by being falsely accused and the false memories of an adult
offspring seem to play far less of a role in their lives.
As I thought about these brief exchanges, I felt that this group
represented a variety of avenues to "moving on." Although coming to
terms with a crisis is a usual occurrence, I believe moving on
differed from what one might anticipate. Some clearly indicated that a
conscious decision was made to move on. These parents seemed to
believe it offered a path to increased happiness and emotional health
and demonstrated that they accepted the reality that they also could
not control (or influence) a retraction any more than they had been
able to control the false accusations. Moreover, I believe that this
type of decision also served to affirm their strength.
Oversimplifying these families' journeys and collapsing variations
into a single sample scenario, one essential common characteristic
becomes evident: this group made the decision to get on with their
lives. They believe a retraction is unlikely, and importantly, they
arrived at the conclusion that a retraction and their accuser
rejoining the family, while desirable, are unnecessary for their lives
to be fulfilled. These parents know that the accusations against them
are false and accept their inability either to control or change the
situation. At the gathering one mother mentioned, for example, that
her family has decided to accept the reality and move on. She believes
that other families like hers would not readily disclose this kind of
decision. I told her that I thought this might be so. My hunch is that
this may be a more difficult course to make public.
The perseverance of fragmented families is remarkable. These
people show their ability to find avenues to display their care and
love for their other children, family and friends. Many have helped
and continue to help other families deal with the consequences of
false accusations without imposing their path on others. Their efforts
and contribution have made it more likely that this particular sad
debacle will destroy fewer families in the future. Moving on is one
more example of the strength of FMS families.